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Abstract
We extend the monetary DSGE model by Gertler and Karadi (2011) with a non-bank
financial intermediary to investigate the impact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate loan
supply. We distinguish between bank and non-bank intermediaries based on the liquidity
of their credit claims. While banks can endogenously create deposits to fund firm loans,
non-banks have to raise deposits on the funding market to function as intermediaries. The
funding market is modeled via search and matching by non-banks for available deposits of
households. Because deposit creation responds to economy-wide productivity automatically,
bank reaction to shocks corresponds to the balance sheet channel. Non-banks are constrained
by the available deposits and their behavior is better explained by the lending channel. The
two credit channels are affected differently following a monetary policy shock. As a result
of these counteracting effects, an increasing non-bank sector leads to a reduced reaction of
aggregate loan supply following a monetary policy shock, which is consistent with the data.
An extension to deposit like-issuance by the non-bank sector will allow further studies of
re-regulating the non-bank sector.
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1 Introduction
The credit channel of monetary policy transmission explains the effects of monetary policy on
the real economy via the lending behavior of banks. Loan issuance is traditionally understood
as one of the core functions of the banking sector. However, the data show that the volume of
financial intermediation via the non-bank financial sector has been rising in the last decades,
even overtaking the traditional banking sector in several countries, see FSB (2013) [10]. Empir-
ical studies indicate that banks and non-banks react differently to monetary policy shocks (see
Altunbas, Gambacrota and Marques-Ibanez (2009) [1]; Den Haan and Sterk (2010) [13]; Igan
et al. (2013) [15]): While banks reduce the amount of loans on their balance sheets following
monetary policy tightening, non-banks increase lending. This suggests that the share of credit
intermediation via the non-bank financial sector is an important determinant of the effectiveness
of monetary policy on aggregate lending and the economy. We therefore ask, how does credit
intermediation via non-banks affect the reaction of aggregate loan supply to monetary policy?
In light of the empirical evidence we develop a structural model that distinguishes between
banks and non-banks based on the liquidity of their credit claims. This analysis allows the
assessment of shocks to the real economy as well as optimal monetary policy. In our model
banks create deposits endogeneously that serve as means of payment in the economy in the sense
of ”inside money” as in Kiyotaki and Moore (2004) [16] . We use the monetary DSGE model
with financial intermediaries by Gertler and Karadi (2011) [11] to describe bank behavior and
deposit creation and extend it with a non-bank, or shadow bank, sector. Non-banks cannot
create deposits and instead need to raise funds from households to satisfy firm loan demand.
We model fund raising by non-banks as a search for previously created deposits by banks on
the funding market. Following Wasmer and Weil (2004) [27], we model funding market frictions
analogously to those on the labor market because of their comparable characteristics of moral
hazard, heterogeneity and specificity.
In the Gertler and Karadi model, an increase in nominal interest rates leads to an adjustment
of deposit rates that banks pay to households. This lowers banks’ net wealth and according to
the balance sheet channel requires deleveraging, resulting in a credit squeeze for the real sector,
disinvestment and a fall in output. Increased deposit rates discourage households from current
consumption and instead encourage savings. In our paper, savings in the form of deposit holdings
constitutes available funds for the non-bank sector. This increase in funds reduces funding market
tightness for shadow banks and results in a higher share of savings in the shadow banking sector.
Non-banks lend out these additional funds and thereby alleviate the credit squeeze, mitigating
the fall in investments and any consequent recession. This is only possible because credit supply
by banks is rationed in the original model. Bank deposits created in the process of lending to
firms pass through the economy a second time in the form of funding for shadow bank credit. The
change in supply of funds to the non-bank sector following monetary policy changes corresponds
to the lending channel of monetary policy transmission.
We argue that banks are less constrained by the supply of loanable funds than non-banks since
they can create deposits endogenously. Their reaction to monetary policy therefore corresponds
more accurately to the balance sheet channel, see Disyatat (2011) [8]. Given their more limited
ability to create credit claims, non-banks are rather constrained by the supply of loanable funds
and their reaction is more accurately captured by the lending channel. By incorporating the
quantitatively important non-bank sector using a basic search and matching framework, we are
able to assess the effects of the lending channel for non-banks compared to the balance sheet
channel for banks, see Mishkin (1995) [22]. The resulting impulse response functions correspond
to empirical impulse responses to monetary policy shocks. Since the non-bank financial sectors
have a different size in different jurisdictions, this model extension can help to better predict
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the impact of monetary policy on aggregate lending and the economy depending on the share of
shadow banks in aggregate lending. In addition, our analysis suggests that a central bank that
ignores the existence of a sizable non-bank financial sector may miss the appropriate monetary
policy reaction to real shocks. The novelty behind our approach is found in the ideas to pin down
household deposits by considering the source of deposit creation, which is the deposit-creating
banking sector, instead of the household sector as well as using the concept of a hierarchy
of money, which places credit claims by banks above those of non-banks (Pozsar, 2014 [24]).
Furthermore, this model can be used to assess the change in regulation for the non-bank financial
sector, although we will consider this in another exploration.
Existing macroeconomic models of shadow banking include Meeks, Nelson and Alessandri
(2014) [20] and Verona, Martins and Drumont (2013) [26]. The former is mainly concerned with
financial stability and considers shadow banks as off balance sheet vehicles of commercial banks
to unload risky loans. Verona et al. study adverse effects of excessively easy monetary policy and
understand shadow banks as financial intermediaries specializing in less risky loans akin to bond
issuance by investment banks. Goodhart et al. (2012) [12] study different regulatory regimes to
stop fire sales by shadow banks and take the opposite view to Verona et al., considering non-
banks to be less risk averse, but still funded by the regular banking sector, comparable to off
balance sheet vehicles as in Meeks et al.
In constrast to these efforts, we define shadow banking more broadly. As the name suggests,
a rise in financial intermediation via these shadow banks has often been attributed to favorable
or unfavorable regulatory circumstances or criminal conduct. Irrespective of the motivation for
operating a shadow bank, we focus on the way that the sector interacts with the economy based
on the nature of their credit claims compared to depository institutions, akin to Mehrling et al.
(2013) [21]. Following the seminal work of Pozsar, Adrian, Ashcraft and Boesky (2010) [25] on
the institutional characteristics of the sector, we focus on the different liquidity characteristics
that liabilities of depository institutions compared to non-depository institutions have. Whereas
banks offer borrowers newly created deposits in their own banks, see ECB (2011) [9] and Bank of
England (McLeay, Radia and Thomas, 2014) [19], shadow banks for the most part have to raise
funds first that they can then lend on, as is the case with non-bank financial institutions that
”intermediate purchasing power that has to first be created by banks” as discussed in Benes,
Kumhof and Laxton (2014) [2]. Shadow banks do create money albeit of a less liquid nature,
not as acceptable in commercial transactions as bank deposits, see also Pozsar (2014) [24] who
writes that ”banks and demand deposits are special [...] because of their unique role in forming
the backbone of the payments system and facilitating the payments of all entities lower in the
system-hierarchy.” Importantly, our paper does not explain money itself with the existence of
frictions in the tradition of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989) [17].
Search and matching in credit markets has been studied since Dell’Arricia and Garibaldi
(1998) [6]. Den Haan, Ramey and Watson (2003) [7] analyze the business cycle effects of long-
term lending relationships with frictions. Wasmer and Weil (2004) [27] study the effects of credit
market frictions on labor market dynamics. What these models have in common is that the total
amount of credit to be allocated is either fixed exogenously or is influenced endogenously but
without any relation to credit creation by banks. We explicitly focus on this interaction.
In the next section, we will describe the basic model, which is a reduced version of Gertler
and Karadi (2011), and the non-bank extension. Section 3 explains how deposit-like issuance
by shadow banks can be incorporated into the analysis. Section 4 explains the deposit creation
mechanism of banks and the intermediation by non-banks in detail. Section 5 contains the model
analysis, including calibration, impulse response functions to monetary policy and technology
shocks, and the behavior of aggregate lending depending on the share of credit intermediation
via non-banks. Section 6 concludes.
3
2 The Model
This section lays out the basic model. It is the monetary DSGE model with financial inter-
mediaries by Gertler and Karadi (2011) [11]. We add a second financial intermediation sector,
called the non-bank financial or shadow banking sector, that issues loans to firms but can not
create deposits and instead relies on the existing volume of savings in the economy. Regardless
of the institutional details, these shadow banks have in common that they are not able to cre-
ate deposits that are acceptable as means of payment.1 Instead, they need to raise funds from
households in the form of deposits created by the banking sector first to engage in firm lending.
Irrespective of whether non-banks lend to the real sector directly, buy repurchase agreements or
whether they buy securitized credit claims of previously originated loans, regulatory constraints
on banks’ balance sheets is freed up and non-banks are the effective intermediary.
In our model the economy is populated by six types of agents: households, deposit creating
financial intermediaries (banks), non-deposit creating financial intermediaries (shadow banks),
non-financial goods producers that demand loans, capital producers, and monopolistically com-
petitive retailers. A central bank conducting monetary policy is the source of monetary distur-
bances and completes the model. The setup is equivalent to the Gertler and Karadi model with
the exception of household savings and shadow banks.
2.1 Households
A continuum of households of measure one exists with each household constituting a family
separated into a share 1 − f of ”workers” and a share f of ”bankers”. Bankers manage the
financial intermediaries called banks, accumulate profits over several periods, which we discuss
below, and eventually redistribute them back to the households that they came from. Workers
consume, save and supply labor. They maximize discounted lifetime utility
max
Ct,Bt,Lt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi[ln(Ct+i − hCt+i−1)− χ
HH
1 + ϕ
L1+ϕt+i ]
subject to the sequence of period budget constraints
Ct = WtLt + Πt +R
w
t Bt −Bt+1.
Each unit of labor Lt earns the real wage Wt. Bt are savings in the form of government bonds,
deposits held at banks, or fund shares with non-banks. Government bonds and deposits are both
riskless and are treated as substitutes. We abstract from the government sector and bonds in
this model, but the interest rate on deposits still equals that on bonds. Savings pay the weighted
interest rate Rwt based on the allocation of deposits in banks and fund shares in non-banks. Πt
are profits from ownership of capital producers, retailers and financial intermediaries, both banks
and non-banks. β is the discount factor, h is the habit parameter, χHH is the relative utility
weight of labor and ϕ is the inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
With %t denoting marginal utility of consumption, the first order conditions for consumption
and labor are given by, respectively,
%t = (Ct − hCt−1)−1 − βhEt(Ct+1 − hCt)−1 (1)
%tWt = χ
HHLϕt (2)
1Some shadow banks do indeed create deposit-like securities that can be used as means of payment in some
transactions, called ”public shadow money” in Pozsar (2014). We will extend our model to deposit-like issuance
of credit claims by shadow banks in Section 3.
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with
EtβΛt,t+1R
w
t+1 = 1 (3)
Λt,t+1 =
%t+1
%t
. (4)
2.2 Banks
Banks are deposit creating financial intermediaries that lend to goods producers. Their balance
sheet is given by
QtSt = Dt+1 +Nt. (5)
Banks fund their loan portfolio St priced at Qt through their net worth Nt and deposits
obtained from households Dt+1 other than their family members. Because they pay interest on
deposits of Rt+1 and earn a return Rkt+1 on their loans, their net worth evolves according to
Nt+1 = Rkt+1QtSt −Rt+1Dt+1
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSt +Rt+1Nt.
Banks want to maximize their expected terminal net wealth before they exit the industry with
a probability θ per period and pay out all the accumulated profits to their respective households.
Expected terminal net wealth is given by
Vt = Et
∞∑
i=0
(1− θ)θiβi+1Λt,t+1+iNt+1+i
= νtQtSt + ηtNt
with ηt being the marginal expected discounted value of net worth and νt being the marginal
expected discounted value of expanding assets
νt = Et[(1− θ)βΛt,t+1(Rkt+1 −Rt+1) + βΛt,t+1θxt,t+1νt+1] (6)
ηt = Et[(1− θ) + βΛt,t+1zt,t+1θηt+1] (7)
and the growth rate in assets zt,t+1 and the growth rate in net worth xt,t+1 defined below.
Since it is profitable to increase their loan portfolio as long as the interest rate differential is
positive, they are bound by an incentive constraint: every period a banker can divert a fraction
of the loan portfolio λ that the depositors at the bank are not able to recover. As a consequence,
the bank goes bankrupt. Accordingly, households will keep their deposits at individual banks
only as long as the franchise value of the bank, Vt, is higher than or equal to the divertible
amount,
Vt ≥ λQtSt.
As in the original model, we will assume that the constraint always binds, and after substi-
tuting and rearranging, the size of a banker’s loan portfolio then depends on the size of their net
wealth according to
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QtSt =
ηt
λ− νtNt (8)
and we can define the leverage ratio as
φt ≡ ηt
λ− νt . (9)
We can also define the growth rate in assets zt,t+1 and the growth rate in net worth xt,t+1 as
zt,t+1 =
Nt+1
Nt
=
(Rkt+1 −Rt+1)QtSt +Rt+1Nt
Nt
= (Rkt+1 −Rt+1)φt +Rt+1 (10)
xt,t+1 =
Qt+1St+1
QtSt
=
φt+1Nt+1
φtNt
=
φt+1
φt
zt,t+1. (11)
Since a constant share 1− θ of bankers dies every period and distributes its retained earnings
to their households, f(1 − θ) workers become new bankers. They receive a start-up net worth
Nnt. Net worth of existing bankers Net and new bankers Nnt make up overall net worth Nt
according to
Nt = Net +Nnt (12)
Net = θ[(Rkt −Rt)φt−1 +Rt]Nt−1 (13)
Nnt = ωQtSt. (14)
Note that existing net worth is predetermined. The only way banks can react to changing
loan demand within the period is via the adjustment of the leverage ratio and thereby deposit
issuance, as well as via the inflow of start-up net worth, Nnt.
2.3 Shadow Banks
In our first analysis, non-bank financial intermediaries cannot create deposits, but instead sell
their own fund shares, FSt, to households in exchange for deposits. We will introduce deposit-
like credit claims of non-banks in section 3. The amount of loans SSBt that non-banks can issue
to the goods producers is therefore given by their balance sheet constraint:
QtS
SB
t = FSt. (15)
The shadow bank is a simple intermediary with no liquidity transformation on its balance
sheet in line with the loanable funds model. To raise funds from households, non-banks post
advertisements vt for their fund shares FSt that they exchange for households’ holdings of bank
deposits, which carries a cost κ and has a probability qt of being successfully matched with a
deposit. The idea behind this is to model investor-fund heterogeneity implicitly. Non-banks
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need to advertise their operations, which is costly. However, not every advertisement speaks to
every household. Households may disagree with investment conditions, the targeted borrower
base or the fund manager. Therefore every advertisement only has a certain probability of being
matched with a given deposit by a household and has to keep searching otherwise.
Accordingly, non-banks maximize their discounted future profits by choosing fund advertise-
ments and loan issuance SSBt :
max
vt,SSBt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiΛt,t+iΠ
SB
t+i.
non-banks’ profits are made up of the interest rate differential times the volume of funds they
intermediate net of advertisement expenses. The interest rates they pay on fund shares, RSBt , is
negotiated below:
ΠSBt = (Rkt −RSBt )Qt−1SSBt−1 − κvt.
Once a non-bank has exchanged fund shares for deposits with households, the match will stay
put until the household withdraws the initial bank deposit. As is common in the literature, we
do not model fund redemption explicitly but instead assume a constant probability of separation
χSB , which results in a law of motion for fund shares: Shadow banks’ period t sources of
funding consist of the fund shares that have not been redeemed plus the new matches from fund
advertisement given by
FSt = (1− χSB)FSt−1 + qtvt. (16)
The first order conditions for posting fund unit advertisements and loan issuance are, respec-
tively,
κ = µtqt,
µtQt = βΛt,t+1
{
(Rkt+1 −RSBt+1)Qt + λt+1(1− χSB)Qt
}
with µt the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint (16). Combining these equations results in
the Euler condition for fund advertisements:
κ
qt
= EtβΛt,t+1
{
(Rkt+1 −RSBt+1) + (1− χSB)
κ
qt+1
}
. (17)
New vacancies will be posted until the marginal cost of matching an additional fund unit is
equal to the marginal benefit of having matched an additional fund unit, which is the combination
of the interest rate differential and avoided future search costs by having established a match in
the previous period.
Matching
To compute the probability of matching a non-bank looking for funds with a household we
assume a funding market matching function m(vt, Dt+1−FSt) that is increasing in its arguments,
the number of fund unit advertisements vt and the number of ’unemployed’ funds Dt+1 − FSt
as seen from the non-banks’ perspective. If a unit of deposits has been exchanged for a fund
share, it is not available for the remaining searching non-banks anymore and hence ’employed’.
We define unemployed funds as
Dut+1 ≡ Dt+1 − FSt. (18)
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Assuming a constant returns to scale matching function, the probability that a non-bank will
find suitable funding is then
q(θt) = m(1, θ
−1
t ) =
m(vt, D
u
t+1)
vt
= θ−ηt (19)
with matching elasticity η and funding market tightness θt given by
θt ≡ vt
Dut+1
. (20)
Interest Rate Bargaining
We assume that the interest rates non-banks pay on funds raised is determined via Nash
bargaining over surpluses. ωHH signifies the relative bargaining power of households, which we
calibrate to match the steady state premium interest rate premium of fund shares compared to
deposits. Interest rates RSBt+1 are negotiated that maximize a convex combination of the surpluses,
RSBt+1 = argmax ω
HH lnV HHt + (1− ωHH)lnV SBt .
The resulting interest rate that non-banks pay for funds raised is (see Appendix 7.1 for details)
RSBt+1 = (1− ωHH)Rt+1 + ωHH {Rkt+1 + θt+1κ} . (21)
If household bargaining power is low, non-banks can get away with paying only the interest
rate Rt+1 that banks pay on their deposits. With increasing bargaining power, non-banks need
to share expected profits with investing households.
The interest rate that households receive on their savings is the weighted average of interests
payments from holdings of deposits and holdings of fund shares
Rwt = Rt
Dt
Bt
+RSBt
FSt−1
Bt
. (22)
2.4 Goods Producers
Perfectly competitive goods producers manufacture intermediate goods and sell them to the
retailer at the relative intermediate output price Pmt. Goods producers can borrow from inter-
mediaries without frictions, i.e., intermediaries can enforce all of their claims. However, since
banks are constrained in the amount of deposits they can issue and non-banks are constrained
in the amount of funds they can raise, lending by intermediaries is capital constrained, which
affects the supply of funds to firms and therefore the required interest rate for borrowing, Rkt+1.
Although non-banks alleviate this constraint, which results in downward pressure on the interest
rate for borrowing, their lending is similarly limited since they need to find unemployed funds
in the funding market, which is characterized by search and matching frictions. As long as the
goods producer pays the required rate it can borrow without frictions. Except for the addition
of another source of funding, capital producers are identical to the ones in the original Gertler
and Karadi model.
The firm maximizes its profits by choosing capital Kt+1 and labor Lt optimally each period.
max
Kt+1,Lt
Et
∞∑
i=0
βiΛt,t+1 [PmtYt + (Qt − δ)Kt −WtLt −RktKtQt−1]
with production given by
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Yt = AtK
α
t L
1−α
t (23)
where α is the capital share, Qt is the real price of capital, δ is the depreciation rate and Wt are
wages.
The first-order conditions are
Rkt+1Qt = Pmt+1α
Yt+1
Kt+1
+ (Qt+1 − δ) (24)
Pmt(1− α)Yt
Lt
= Wt. (25)
Since firms do not earn any profits, they pay out ex post returns to capital as interest
payments, resulting in no profits state by state. They pay out all their profits to their creditors,
who are a combination of bankers and shadow bankers according to
Kt+1 = St + S
SB
t . (26)
2.5 Capital Producers
Following the original Gertler Karadi approach, capital producers buy leftover capital from goods
producers which they refurbish, for which the price is unity. Units of new capital are made using
input of final output and are then sold to goods producers at Qt, which capital producers set by
solving
max
Int
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−tΛt,τ
{
(Qτ − 1)Inτ − f
(
Inτ + ISS
Inτ−1 + ISS
)
(Inτ + ISS)
}
with
Int ≡ It − δKt
where f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) > 0. f(.) determines capital adjustment costs with the steady
state value for investments given by ISS . The capital producer thus creates profits outside of the
steady state. Households receive profits from sales of new capital at price Qt, which is given by
the first-order condition
Qt = 1 + f(.) +
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
f ′(.)− EtβΛt,t+1
(
Int+1 + ISS
Int + ISS
)2
f ′(.). (27)
2.6 Retailers
Retailers buy intermediate goods from goods producers at the relative intermediate output price
Pmt. Final output is the CES composite of a continuum of output by each retailer f with the
elasticity of substitution , given by
Yt =
[∫ 1
0
Y
−1

ft df
] 
−1
.
Because users of final output minimize costs, we have
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Yft =
(
Pjt
Pt
)−
Yt
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
P 1−ft df
] 1
1−
.
Each retailer can reset prices with probability 1 − γ each period. Retailers will otherwise
index their prices to lagged inflation. The retailers then choose their reset price P ∗t optimally to
solve
max
P∗t
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβiΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − Pmt+i
]
Yft+i.
The first-order condition is given by
Et
∞∑
i=0
γiβiΛt,t+1
[
P ∗t
Pt+i
i∏
k=1
(1 + pit+k−1)γp − 
− 1Pmt+i
]
Yft+i = 0.
The evolution of the price level is given by
Pt = [(1− γ)(P ∗t )1− + γ(Πγpt−1Pt−1]1/(1−).
2.7 Resources and Policy
The aggregate resource constraint is given by
Yt = Ct + κvt + It + f
(
Int + ISS
Int−1 + ISS
)
(Int + ISS) (28)
and capital evolves according to
Kt+1 = Kt + Int. (29)
Monetary policy is characterized by a Taylor rule. The nominal interest rate is given by it,
with a steady state interest rate of iSS , the natural rate of output given by Y
∗
t , an interest rate
smoothing parameter ρ, the inflation coefficient κpi and the output gap coefficient κy:
it = (1− ρ) [iSS + κpipit + κy(logYt − logY ∗t )] + ρit−1 + t. (30)
The exogeneous shock to monetary policy enters the nominal interest rate as t. The nominal
interest rate has an effect on the economy through the Fisher relation
1 + it = Rt+1Et(1 + pit+1). (31)
3 Extension: Deposit-like Issuance by Shadow Banks
IN PROGRESS
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Figure 1: Change in balance sheets after lending increase
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4 Intermediation Mechanism
In this section, we will look at the change in agents’ balance sheets that is caused by additional
lending by banks. We do not show the gross balance sheets but focus instead on the within-period
adjustments starting out from the economy’s steady state. Note that the following analysis is
for the case without the extension of deposit-like issuance by shadow banks.
Households maximize their utility with respect to consumption and savings, which results in
the Euler equation (3). This equation determines relative saving or dissaving by the household
sector compared to the previous period but does not pin down the absolute amount of savings
in the economy. Although each household can choose its level of savings, the household sector
as a whole can not control the level of privately created money. Instead, banks choose the
amount of deposits that maximizes their terminal value. This is in line with ECB (2011),
who explain that ”banks may also lend to borrowers, but thereby create deposits (initially held
by the borrowers)” and McLeay, Radia and Thomas (2014), who show how money creation
by the commercial banking sector is determined by the profitability of loans and not by new
savings being deposited in banks. This is in contrast to non deposit creating intermediaries, such
as ”insurance corporations, as well as pension and investment funds” who ”may intermediate
between savers and borrowers by issuing securities and lending the receipts onward” (ECB, 2011).
That is, non-banks need to find previously created deposits that they can lend on, consistent
with the loanable funds model, e.g. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) [14].
In the model this is embodied as follows. Banks finance loans through their liabilities, own
net worth and issued deposits. Since bank net worth is partly predetermined according to (12),
lending mostly adjust by varying the amount of deposits, see (5). The leverage ratio increases
endogenously in the marginal expected discounted values of assets and net worth, signaling higher
productivity in the economy. Therefore, banks are always able to create new deposits to fund
lending if the loans are used productively, i.e. if expected profits allow goods producers to pay
a borrowing rate above the deposit rate.
Contrast this to non-banks that perform a similar function to banks, channeling funds from
households to firms. They are unable to create deposits and instead have to find previously
created yet idle deposits to finance lending (we will later relax this assumption in an extension
and make credit claims created by non-banks, the shadow counterpart to deposits, a less liquid
but still acceptable form of payments in the economy, see Section 3). In this first approximation,
shadow bankers do not have the ability to steal the assets the way that bankers do. However,
shadow bankers do not have the ability to create deposits, either. The privilege of deposit
creation is therefore attached to the responsibility of assuring one’s depositors that their funds
are safe.
To make the mechanism clear consider the changes in balance sheets within the period that
an increase in lending implies. Depicted in figure 1, panel (a), are five of the agents in the model
(retailers are not depicted since no transformation of balance sheets takes place). After a shock
occurs at the beginning of the period, goods producers decide on how much physical capital they
want to invest in. Assume for the moment that the shock causes increased productivity of the
real sector and leads to additional lending (impulse response functions are analyzed in Sections
5.2 and 5.3). Goods producers need to finance physical capital with a loan of the same size from
the banks. In return for the loan, the goods producers receive deposits from the banks to pay
the capital producers, who create the physical capital in the amount demanded.
In panel (b) the capital producers sell their physical capital and receive deposits from the
goods producers in return, who deposit them in their deposit accounts at their respective banks.
Regardless of whether the capital producers selling the capital are at the same bank as the goods
producers buying the capital, the total amount of newly created deposits can only reside within
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the banking system. Some banks will receive less deposits from capital producers than they lent
out to goods producers and some will receive more. Any bank that received too few deposits
will borrow deposits at the deposit rate Rt+1 from other banks that received too many deposits
to make up for any shortfall in funding and vice versa.
Since the capital producers belong to the households, any profits in the form of deposits are
returned to them, as shown in panel (c). In the original Gertler and Karadi model, households
will hold the deposits with the bank and receive interest on them in the next period.
In the baseline case, non-banks cannot offer internally created credit claims to borrowers that
would serve as means of payment, like banks, because capital producers will not accept them
in return for capital. Instead, non-banks need to raise funds in the form of previously created
deposits. Since non-banks offer a higher return than banks, households will invest some of their
deposits with them if there is a match, see panel (d). In return for the deposits, households
receive fund shares on which the non-banks pay interest.
Since goods producers are loan constrained, non-banks offer these deposits to the goods pro-
ducers in return for further interest payments, panel (e). Panel (f) shows the final configuration
at the end of the period. At the beginning of the next period, households will receive interest
on their deposits with banks and on their fund shares with non-banks, who each pay them with
the proceeds of the interest payments they receive from goods producers.
5 Model Analysis
In this section, we will first pin down the model parameterization. Next we analyze how monetary
policy and technology shocks propagate through the economy, both with and without non-banks.
Finally we look at the effect of monetary policy on aggregate loan supply depending on the relative
share of intermediation via the shadow banking system in the economy. Note that the following
analysis is for the case without the extension of deposit-like issuance by shadow banks. The
model is solved via first order perturbation around the deterministic steady state.
5.1 Calibration
Table 1 shows the chosen parameter values. All of the parameters present in the Gertler and
Karadi original model are kept. The new parameters that follow the introduction of the shadow
banking sector are the separation rate χSB , household bargaining power ωHH , fund advertise-
ment cost κ, and elasticity η of the matching function.
Since the shadow banking sector is heterogeneous it is often difficult to pin down a parameter
value that is acceptable or even applicable for every part of the sector. For the separation rate,
we choose a value of 5% to correspond with the quarterly redemption rates of mutual funds in
the US. Household bargaining power is calibrated in such a way as to match the steady state
interest rate premium households receive on their fund shares compared to deposits. Vacancy
posting costs mostly influence the fund finding rate q, the probability that a vacancy will be
turned into a match. The amount of vacancies posted will decrease with the cost, decreasing
competition for funds and making it more likely that a vacancy will be turned into a match.
We therefore assume a value of 0.05 for κ, which results in a 10% quarterly chance of a vacancy
being turned into a match. Matching elasticity η indicates the share of vacancies and unemployed
funds necessary for a match and can be used to regulate the size of the shadow banking system.
Low values for elasticities require high amounts of unemployed funds for each match and vice
versa. We assume a relatively large shadow banking system that intermediates about 40% of all
credit in the economy. This is roughly in line with loan intermediation in the UK. The US has
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Households
β .99 Discount rate
h 0 (0.815) Habit
χHH 3.409 Relative utility weight of labor
ϕ .276 Inverse Frisch elasticity of labor supply
Banks
λ .381 Fraction of capital that can be diverted
ω .002 Proportional transfer to the incoming bankers
θ .972 Survival rate of the bankers
Goods Producers
α .33 Effective capital share
δ .025 Depreciation rate
Retail Firms
 4.167 Elasticity of substitution
γ .779 Probability of keeping prices fixed
γp .241 Price indexation
Monetary Policy
κpi 1.5 Inflation coefficient of Taylor rule
κy .125 Output gap coefficient of Taylor rule
ρi .95 Smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule
Shocks
ρa .95 Autocorrelation of technology shock
σa .01 Standard deviation of technology shock
σi .005 Standard deviation of interest rate shock
Shadow Banks
χSB .05 Separation rate
ωHH .5 Household bargaining power
κ .05 Vacancy posting cost
η .9 Matching elasticity
Table 1: Parameter Values
a larger share of loans intermediated via the shadow banking system while the European Union
has a lower share on average.
5.2 Response to a monetary policy shock
First, consider the case with no shadow banks present in the economy. After an unexpected
monetary tightening of about 25 basis points, interest rates on government bonds increase. In
order to encourage depositors to keep their savings with banks instead of shifting them into
government bonds, banks need to raise interest on deposits. This increases bank funding costs
and in order to keep their profit margin up, banks need to simultaneously raise the interest rate
they demand from goods producers, which tightens credit standards and expels the least credit
worthy borrowers. This reduces investments and therefore capital overall, as well as the price of
capital. The unanticipated decrease in capital value weakens the ability of borrowers to repay
their loans, resulting in an increased external finance premium (EFP), which further dampens
investment. A negative financial accelerator as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1996) [3]
ensues. In addition, higher deposit interest rates increase savings and reduce consumption. The
drop in demand reduces prices and makes goods production even less profitable, putting further
downward pressure on capital demand for production.
When non-banks are present, we see that the initial reaction is the same. Nominal and real
rates rise, and to keep profit margins up, banks raise the borrowing rate. However, now the rise in
interest rates on government bonds, bank deposits and bank loans has another effect. Non-banks
negotiate the fund rate over their expected profits and households’ alternative savings. Both the
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borrowing rate and deposit rates rise, which increases the fund rate. Since the borrowing rate
increases more than the funds rate, the interest rate differential that non-banks earn increases and
makes intermediation more profitable, raising vacancy postings. This increases new fund share
sales and allows the non-banks to offer more credit, which is consistent with empirical studies of
the shadow banking system (see Altunbas, Gambacrota and Marques-Ibanez (2009) [1]; Den Haan
and Sterk (2010) [13]; Igan et al. (2013) [15]). Since many previously creditworthy borrowers
were pushed out of the market, non-bank loans now replace some of the lost credit. This has a
dampening effect on the fall in investment, which dramatically reduces capital decumulation to
about half the case without non-banks. Because non-banks offer this high fund rate, initially more
consumption is saved, increasing the fall in output. After this drop, output and consumption
rebound more quickly than in the case without non-banks, since the external finance premium
falls more quickly and the financial accelerator is weakened.
The reduction in non-bank loans after around eight quarters is due to the reduction in deposit
holdings, which have not rebounded to their steady state levels because the economy is still
in recession and demand for capital financing is below steady state levels. Increased funding
market tightness in addition to a normalization of the interest rate differential non-banks earn
on intermediation decrease the profitability and result in a reduction of loans below steady state
levels. Because the shadow banking sector initially alleviated the financial accelerator, lending by
the banking sector recovered more quickly than without non-banks and fills the missing non-bank
loans after eight quarters.
5.3 Response to a technology shock
Next, we consider the effects of a positive technology shock of one standard deviation, which
corresponds to a 1% increase of the goods producers’ productivity, and first focus on the case
without non-banks. The basic mechanism is standard as in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist
(1996) [4]. As the marginal productivity of capital and labor rises, increases in both capital
and labor lead to increased investments and wages, respectively. Increased investments raise
the price of capital, which increases net worth and decreases the external finance premium.
Favorable credit conditions stimulate more investments, which affects the economy long after the
technology shock has dissipated. Given the leverage constraint on deposit creation by banks,
increased economic productivity increases bank net wealth, which results in higher deposits.
Non-banks do not change the picture dramatically. Since deposits rise and with them un-
employed funds, funding market tightness is reduced and the fund finding rate increases. The
increase in fund shares translates into increased non-bank credit intermediation. In constrast to a
monetary policy shock, non-banks’ reactions are comparable to that of banks, which is necessary
to meet additional credit demand given that non-banks in this parameterization intermediate a
sizable amount of credit. The overall effect of non-banks is a slightly reduced external finance
premium.
The biggest difference in the responses is in the case of inflation, where the initial reaction
without non-banks is mild deflation compared to mild inflation with non-banks. In both cases
this is followed by a long deflationary period. Accordingly, the reaction of monetary policy
is reversed. Whereas the monetary authority sets nominal interest rates lower when inflation
is below the target as is the case without non-banks, nominal interest rates are increased in
the presence of non-banks to counter inflation. Since they only converge after 8 quarters, this
discrepancy suggests inoptimal reaction of monetary policy to technology shocks if the lending
mechanism of non-banks is quantitatively important but neglected in the model. Given that the
absolute difference is only a few basis points in this analysis, the practical difference this makes
is most likely negligible. However, more research is warranted.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions to a Monetary Policy Tightening
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions to a Positive Technology Shock
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Figure 4: Size-dependent response of aggregate lending to a monetary policy shock
5.4 Shadow bank size-dependent response of aggregate lending to a
monetary policy shock
Since the reaction of lending by banks and non-banks following a monetary policy shock is in
opposite directions, we are interested in the aggregate effect of a monetary policy shock. The
size of the non-bank loan volume will have an impact on the aggregate change in loans. We
therefore vary the size of the shadow banking sector by changing matching elasticity η. Figure 4
shows the cumulative change in aggregate loan volume and output for the first 20 periods after
a monetary tightening of 25 basis points for different relative sizes of the shadow banking sector.
The size of the shadow banking sector is capped at the amount of deposits in circulation,
because non-banks are not able to create their own credit claims in this first analysis. Households
may at most shift all of their deposits into fund shares, which results in a relative loan amount
of less than 50%, because the amount of deposits is smaller than the amount of loans issued by
the banking sector (some of the bank loans are financed by bank equity).
If matching elasticities are small enough, almost no deposits will be allocated to the shadow
banking sector. The resulting relative intermediation is zero and aggregate lending is reduced by
more than 15% over the next 20 quarters following a monetary tightening. Cumulative lost out-
put, which depends on the amount of production and hence financing via loans, is around 11.5%.
The figure shows that an increase of the shadow banking sector first decreases the cumulative
reduction of aggregate loan issuance. Total loan reduction is halved when the shadow banking
sector issues around 25% of all loans. Increasing matching elasticity further, and therefore the
relative loan supply by non-banks, has a negative effect on total cumulative intermediation. A
growing shadow banking sector beyond the 25% mark will result in fewer loans. At the limit
of approximately 40% of loan intermediation via the shadow banking sector, cumulative loan
reduction is around 10%.
There are three interacting factors that explain this outcome. First, increasing the matching
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Figure 5: Steady State Levels with Different Matching Elasticities
elasticity η increases the number of matches for any set of matching inputs (vt, B
u
t+1), which has
an impact on the cost for finding matches and therefore on the absolute size of the shadow banking
sector. Following Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) [23], matching elasticity also determines
the extent of externalities search participants impose on each other: Increasing η increases the
congestion caused by each searching shadow bank on other searching shadow banks. At the same
time, an increase in η increases the positive externality (thick-market effect) of unemployed funds
on searching shadow banks. Second, the amount of unemployed funds But+1 is decreasing in the
size of the shadow banking sector, because non-bank credit is substituted for bank credit while
households increase their relative savings in fund shares, lessening the need for deposits, see
Figure 5. Third, the shadow banking system decreases credit rationing by banks and therefore
increases economic activity.
In the case of a small shadow banking sector we have many unemployed funds and few search-
ing non-banks. Without fierce competition on the funding market, shadow bank vacancies result
in additional credit that competes with bank credit and results in increased economic activity.
Increasing matching elasticity stimulates the economy further and initially makes job vacancy
postings more profitable until the shadow banking system intermediates around 30% of total
credit. At the same time a decreasing amount of unemployed funds and an increase in non-banks
looking for funds coupled with increasing congestion effects results in more competition on the
funding markets. This leads to competition for funds among non-banks to eventually become
more pronounced, decreasing profitability of fund vacancies, see Figure 5. The increased com-
petition drives non-banks out of the lending market and decreases the additional loans available
through the shadow banking system.
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Increasing the shadow banking size initially offsets some of the loan displacement because
non-banks offer loans to companies that previously received funding from the banking sector.
After a threshold of around 25% of aggregate loan intermediation by non-banks is reached,
competition among non-banks reduces the profitability of intermediation, making non-bank credit
less responsive to disturbances
6 Preliminary Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced non-bank financial intermediaries into a monetary financial
DSGE model via the relatively parsimonious search and matching framework. In the simple
case, only deposits are used as means of payment in the economy. Since banks create deposits
endogenously to fund loans, funding supply is not a constraint on bank lending. Banks’ response
to shocks therefore represents the balance sheet channel of monetary policy transmission. Non-
banks have to raise funds in the form of deposits to act as intermediaries. Their behavior is
therefore dependent on the supply of deposits and corresponds more accurately to the lending
channel. Modeling non-banks based on the differing nature of their credit claims compared to
banks results in impulse response functions suggested by empirical studies of the sector: Following
a monetary policy tightening, banks will decrease the amount of loans on their balance sheets
while non-banks will increase loans. As a consequence, non-banks can significantly reduce the
real effects of nominal shocks. Increasing the size of non-banks in the economy therefore results
in a dampened response of aggregate lending to monetary policy shocks.
Another finding is that central bank policy may not react optimally to real shocks if it
does not take the presence of non-bank intermediaries into account. Since banks and non-
banks react to technology shocks in a comparable way, credit creation is amplified, which affects
inflation. Monetary policy as modeled by a Taylor rule will not anticipate these effects if non-
banks are not taken account of, and will therefore not react optimally. The recognition of
non-bank intermediary behavior or a modified Taylor rule that includes data on money and
credit as in Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) [5] may solve this issue.
The modification of impulse response functions in the face of different financial intermediaries
suggests an impact on the welfare effects of business cycles in the tradition of Lucas (2003) [18].
This analysis may shed light on the optimal size and regulation of non-banks in an economy.
Given that non-banks alleviate the monopoly power of banks by channeling the bank created de-
posits through the economy a second time, steady state values of a non-bank based economy will
differ from the exclusively bank based economy. Different steady state values will complicate the
welfare analysis, which usually compares short term policies for equivalent long term positions.
In the model, non-banks fund themselves through fund shares that are sold to households only.
In reality, non-banks are a huge debtor to banks. Additionally, non-banks are not able to create
their own credit claims to be used as means of payment in the economy. These simplifications
will be addressed in future versions of the paper and will then allow us to experiment with the
re-regulation of the shadow banking sector, including the moneyness of shadow banking credit
claims and optimal central bank policy.
In addition, household savings allocations are passively modeled in this version. The explicit
microfoundation of savings decisions, together with the introduction of uncertain returns from
the intermediary sector, will allow further realism and additional policy experiments.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Interest Rate Bargaining
The marginal surplus non-banks stand to gain from lending out an additional loan is the difference
between the value of an employed share V SB,e versus an unemployed share V SB,u, with
V SB,et = φ
SB
t (Rkt −RSBt ) + βΛt,t+1[(1− χ)V SB,et+1 + χV SB,ut+1 ]
V SB,ut = −κ+ βΛt,t+1[qtV SB,et+1 + (1− qt)V SB,ut+1 ].
(φSBt is the leverage ratio of money creating shadow banks. In the simple case we assume
no money creation by the central bank and set this value to 1.) If non-banks find a fund share
buyer, they earn the difference on the interest rates and will keep this surplus if the match is
not separated. If they do not find a match, they have to advertise, incurring advertisement costs
κ, which has a probability qt of finding a match next period. In accordance with the free entry
condition in the labor search literature, we assume that non-banks advertise until the value of
an unemployed share is zero, V SB,u = 0. We can then express βΛt,t+1V
SB,e
t+1 = κ/qt. Inserting
this above, the value of an employed share under free entry is then
V SBt = φ
SB
t (Rkt −RSBt ) + (1− χ)
κ
qt
.
For a household the value of savings at non-banks V HH,e versus savings at banks V HH,u are
V HH,et = R
SB
t + βΛt,t+1[(1− χ)V HH,et+1 + χV HH,ut+1 ]
V HH,ut = Rt + βΛt,t+1[ftV
HH,e
t+1 + (1− ft)V HH,ut+1 ],
where ft ≡ m(vt, But+1)/But+1 is the probability of an unemployed deposit being intermediated
through a non-bank. The surplus from lending to a non-bank is the difference they receive in
interest rates together with the value they have from keeping that savings relationship,
V HHt = R
SB
t −Rt + βΛt,t+1(1− χ− ft)V HHt+1 .
From the first-order condition for interest rate bargaining we know that
ωHH
V HHt
=
φSBt (1− ωHH)
V SBt
.
Solving this forward one period and inserting above, as well as inserting V SBt+1 , we get for the
households surplus
V HHt = R
SB
t −Rt + (1− χ− ft)βΛt,t+1V SBt+1
ωHH
1− ωHH .
= RSBt −Rt + (1− χ− ft)
κ
qt
ωHH
φSBt (1− ωHH)
.
Inserting the surpluses for non-banks and households into the first-order condition and solving
forward one period results in
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ωHH{
φSBt (R
SB
t+1 −Rt+1) + (1− χ− ft+1) κqt+1 ω
HH
1−ωHH
} = (1− ωHH){
φSBt (Rkt+1 −RSBt+1) + (1−χ)κqt+1
} ,
which can be solved for the interest rate non-banks have to pay on their fund shares
RSBt+1 = (1− ωHH)Rt+1 + ωHH
{
Rkt+1 + θt+1
κ
φSBt
}
.
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